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Introduction 
The land questions facing Southern Africa are dominated by the negative effects of distorted 
settler-colonial decolonization and the associated failure to address the national question, 
sustainable development, and democracy, within the context of incomplete national democratic 
revolutions. While important differences exist in the nature of the Southern African countries’ 
land questions and ways in which these have been addressed, there are critical similarities in 
the fundamental socio-political and economic questions that arise from the persistent conflicts 
that ensue from unequal land distribution and discriminatory land tenure systems (Moyo, 2003). 
Land remains a basic source of the livelihood of the majority of Southern Africans, and is 
essential to the development of agriculture, tourism and housing. Economic development within 
a context of agrarian transformation and industrialization tends to be distorted by the spread of 
skewed agrarian structures in the region. Thus, the land question is not only an agrarian issue 
but also a critical social question regarding inequitable patterns of resource allocation within the 
rural-urban divide and the agricultural-industrial divide. This underlies the persistently conflictive 
relations of class, gender, race and ethnicity, as well as the processes of inter-class labour 
exploitation, differential taxation and resource access and benefits, in the context of the 
marginalization of the majority rural populations in the region. Even in South Africa and Zambia, 
more urbanized than elsewhere in the region, high unemployment rates (ranging between 30-
50%) have caused land questions to be attenuated by the wider crisis of homeless and jobless 
urbanization and dependence on straddling rural-urban livelihoods. Inequitable land ownership 
and utilisation patterns distort the integration of space and developments strategy due to the 
predominance of narrow enclave development (Nzimande, 2004). 
The peasant question in Southern Africa has for long been subordinated in terms of ideology 
and substance by white setter landlordism and institutionalized racial discrimination by the state 
and capital, and justified by an agrarian modernization project based on peripheral export 
oriented capitalist agriculture (Moyo, The land question in Africa). Thus, land and racial conflicts 
that affect Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe have remained unaddressed for long, despite 
the fact that their peasantries continue to be marginalized and to expand. In other Southern 
African countries, new land questions arise from emerging land and agrarian differentiation.  
Zimbabwe has broken with this trend, and exhibits critical insights on the future of the 
peasantry having reshaped its agrarian structure substantially in terms of the scale and quality 
of the producer base and social relations. This has yielded rural and/agrarian class formation 
processes which, while enabling the peasantry to maintain itself at basic levels of social 
reproduction, have spawned a new differentiated agrarian class structure, which however 
privileges “peripheral” (or semi-peripheral) capital accumulation among an expanded but 
deracialised economically straddling elite. This essentially bimodal path of agrarian change 
presents the contradictory class interests of large capitalists, middle “peasants” and “poor” 
peasants and workers, whereby resolving racial aspects of the land question through a 
peripheral export economic model predicates the continuation of poverty among a peasantry 
within a marginalized economy. 
On the other hand, the land question in South Africa remains unresolved partly because of 
its own gradualistic neoliberal approach to land reform, but largely because the peasant 
question (or even the small farmer development trajectory) has been denied by official land 
reform policy and intellectual debate. This reflects teleological tendencies of debates, which 
envision greater industrial and non-agricultural employment growth that is expected to diminish 
peasant demand for land, as well as ideologies that decry the “inefficiency” of peasant 
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production systems and livelihoods per se. The growing urban and peri–urban demand for land, 
required for housing and petty commodity production, which is contingent upon growing semi-
proletarianisation and unemployment, has however also been neglected by South Africa’s 
market based land reform and neoliberal social security policies. These trends raise the spectre 
of increased land conflicts resulting from the demands of a growing but blocked peasantry and 
the urban poor, as well as a nascent black bourgeoisie, poised against minority white landlords.  
The dilemmas of the land question in Southern Africa arise from a poor understanding of the 
peasant question in particular, and of the constraints on “articulated” development in the semi-
periphery.  
The fate of the peasantry in terms of its socio-economic character and political significance 
under capitalism remains central to neo-colonial Southern African futures
1
. Is the peasantry 
disappearing economically or becoming politically insignificant (Moyo and Yeros, 2004) given 
the emerging perception on agrarian change, since “the implementation of structural adjustment 
policies and market liberalisation worldwide has had a dissolving effect on peasant livelihoods”? 
(Bryceson, 2000). In this light, what is the land question in Southern Africa? 
 
The land question in Southern Africa 
From decolonization to radical and neoliberal land reforms 
Different forms of settler colonization in the region, with regard to the degree of colonial 
expropriation of land, define the main differences in the land questions faced, particularly with 
regard to the nature of the unresolved national questions. Thus, where mild land expropriation 
and white settler occupation was obtained, for instance in Swaziland, Botswana, Zambia, and 
Malawi, less explosive land questions are found, although over time land concentration among 
blacks has become the issue. Extreme settlerist land expropriation in Zimbabwe, South Africa, 
Namibia, Mozambique and Angola led to a more protracted liberation struggle and persistent 
land conflicts. However, it is critical to recognise the regionally systemic nature of the land 
questions that the legacy of colonialisation brought to Southern Africa. Namely, that land 
expropriation in parts of the region, generalized migrant labour mobilization (especially in 
Lesotho), and dispossession of land in the current free state of Malawi, the former Rhodesia 
and South Africa, were intertwined facets of the growth of South Africa’s regional agro-
industrial, mining and commercial farm enclaves, and of Zimbabwe and Zambian mining and 
agricultural enclaves in the middle of the last century. 
The regions’ economies founded on labour migration and enclave settlement patterns 
depended on the subsidizing of urban wage incomes by the so-called rural subsistence 
economies, based on marginal lands, as well as on the combined rural-urban livelihoods that 
define popular income flows in the regional economy. The linkage of agro-industrial capital in 
the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region today reflects historically 
hegemonic settler interactions and common models of land and agrarian management, within 
an agro-industrial development strategy focused on European exports, and are mediated mainly 
through large South African capital and regional labour markets. This development model 
defines the highly inequitable income and consumption distribution patterns, and the 
persistence of marginalized rural and informal economies. 
The form and outcome of the national liberation process has had varied implications on the 
manner in which the national question, the land questions and democracy have been addressed 
in Southern Africa. Specific national approaches to resolving the land question reflected the 
varied decolonization processes and mobilizations of the liberation movements, particularly 
since the mid-1970s, when détente emerged, and the waning ‘end’ of the cold war from the 
1980s. Hence, the varied tactics of land reform experienced in Southern Africa since the 1970s 
(in the Lusophone zone), in the 1980s and early 1990s in Zimbabwe and Namibia, and the post-
apartheid approaches (of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia) as well as the neo-liberal land 
(essentially tenure) policy formation processes experienced since the 1960s in other SADC 
countries. Where liberation was decisively concluded, as in Mozambique and Angola, in spite of 
internal armed conflicts over the national question, fuelled by external destabilization, the land 
question appears to have been broadly resolved. Where liberation was partially concluded, as in 
the main settler territories of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, negotiated settlements left 
both the national and land question relatively unresolved. In particular, the racial dimensions of 
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the national question have not been adequately addressed, as we have seen recently. Thus, 
racially inequitable structures of wealth, income and land distribution remained intact, while 
liberal democratic constitutions and market principles protected these inequalities and 
inequities. This limited the scope and pace of land and agrarian reforms.  
Moreover, the corporatist-liberal states that emerged, and their articulation within global 
capital through the IFIs (especially the Bretton Woods Institutions), the development aid 
structures (bilateral and multi-lateral donors and lending structures) and the trade system, 
eventually consolidated the neo-liberal framework used to address the regions’ national 
questions and the land reform strategies adopted. The latter can be seen to have been 
interconnected by an increasing common neo-liberal ideology and common economic 
management strategies of externally imposed and homegrown SAP-type macro-economic 
stabilization, outward-looking trade liberalisation and de-regulation of domestic markets (land, 
labour and commodity). These processes led, over four decades, from Tanzania to Zimbabwe, 
to varying degrees of de-industrialization of growth enclaves that had been based on capital-
intensive industrialization processes, since the 1950s, alongside an increasing dependence of 
most of the regions’ economies on land for social survival. The lessons from this are common 
failure of land reforms and economic transitions, and narrow dissidences of approach to land 
reform and economic management. 
Therefore, the specific trajectory of land reform processes in the SADC region needs to be 
examined in terms of the 40-year history of national liberation, if the apparently varied 
experiences of the evolving land questions facing Southern Africa and the land reform tactics 
used are to be understood. Whereas different socio-economic and political specificities need to 
be critically reflected upon, it is however the gradual shifts in the terrain of national 
independence and liberation struggles among the countries since the 1960s, in terms of their 
ideological and political mobilisation of social forces in response to imperial tactics, which 
distinguishes the specific land reform strategies experienced.  
Thus, the SADC region of the 1960s and 1970s experienced a clear divide between the 
radical nationalist-cum-socialist orientation to land reform and liberal approaches. The former 
were based upon the nationalization of settler lands and foreign commercial/industrial structures 
of capital (as pursued in Tanzania and Zambia during the 1960s and early 1970s) and in 
Mozambique and Angola (from the mid-1970s). In contradistinction to this, the more liberal 
strategies of land reform were found during the same period in the smaller colonial 
‘protectorates’, which predominantly faced indirect colonial rule accompanied by minor degrees 
of white settlerism alongside cheap migrant labour systems in Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho 
and Malawi. In the latter countries, the land reform experiences involved a limited degree of 
market-based expropriation of settler lands, accompanied by market-led compensation with 
some colonial finance, as was the case in Swaziland and Botswana, for example. Such lands 
held by small settler communities were mainly indigenized with limited foreign and white 
minority-dominated large-scale land ownership and with estate farming, remaining alongside the 
emergence of state farms and the resilience of largely peasant and pastoral agrarian structures.  
The nature and outcome of land reform radicalization also varied. Whereas Tanzania, 
Zambia and Mozambique had pursued socialistic land and agrarian reforms largely based upon 
state marketing systems, and land settlement and use reorganization (villagisation and rural 
development in Tanzania and resettlement and integrated development in Zambia), 
Mozambique followed land nationalization with even more intensive attempts at socialistic 
transformation of the land and agrarian question through state and cooperative farms. Angola, 
which started mired in civil war throughout, did not pursue further significant land reform after 
the land nationalisation from 1975. Civil war in the Lusophone territories, fuelled by South 
African destabilization and relative international isolation, however contained radical agrarian 
reforms there. 
The liberal approach to the resolution of the land question varied slightly. It consisted mainly 
of limited market-led land re-distribution efforts and attempts to modernize peasant agriculture 
within a contradictory context of imbalanced public resources allocations. The latter were 
focused primarily on developing the large-scale indigenized and state capitalist farming sub-
sector and its increasing incorporation into global agricultural export markets. This form of land 
and agrarian reform led to intensified land concentration in the various Southern African 
countries, a steady growth of agrarian social differentiation based on capitalist accumulation, 
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labour exploitation and rural marginalization, and a bi-modal agrarian structure, which became 
entrenched at different scales throughout the region. 
 
The nature and significance of the peasantry in Southern Africa 
Peasantry –small-scale/family agriculturalists operating within the generalized system of 
commodity production– does not constitute a class in itself, but inherent in it are the antagonistic 
tendencies of proletarian and proprietor. The ideal-type ‘peasant household’ reproduces itself as 
both capital and labour simultaneously and in internal contradiction, but this combination of 
capital and labour is not spread evenly within the peasantry, for two reasons. First, the 
peasantry is differentiated between the rich, middle, and poor petty-commodity producers, a 
spectrum that ranges from the capitalist who employs labour-power, beyond the family, to the 
semi-proletarian who sells it. As such, the middle peasantry is the only category that embodies 
the ideal-type of petty-bourgeois production, managing to neither hire nor sell labour-power –
and which in turn is rare (Moyo and Yeros, 2004). Second, the combination of capital and labour 
is not spread evenly within a single household either; differentiated by gender and generation, 
patriarchs will control the means of production, while women and children will provide unpaid 
labour. While this may appear on the surface as a ‘different’ mode of production, it has been 
argued convincingly that petty-commodity production is firmly embedded in the capitalist system 
and in fact is a normal feature of capitalist society, even if subordinate and unstable (Gibbon 
and Neocosmos, 1985). 
Under capitalism, the peasantry remains in a state of flux, within the centre-periphery 
structure spawned by colonialism, as proletarianisation co-exists with peasantisation and semi-
proletarianisation. The form and scale of the actually existing peasantry is both an empirical and 
an interpretive problem to be understood from the composition of household income by source, 
including non-exchangeable sources of sustenance, and from an analysis of household 
residential patterns, and between town and country. It has been argued that under structural 
adjustment peasants have become ‘problematic’, insofar as they are ‘multi-occupational, 
straddling urban and rural residences, [and] flooding labour markets’ (Bryceson, 2000). Yet, the 
peasantry has been problematic in this way for much of the twentieth century
2
. 
Structural adjustment has been accompanied by intensified migration. Africa now has 
notched up the fastest rate of urbanization in the world (3.5% annually), and nearly 40% of the 
population is now urbanised. This fact is often used as proof that the land/agrarian question is 
losing its relevance. Migration does not mean full proletarianisation or permanent urbanisation, 
but the spreading of risk in highly adverse circumstances, with urbanization moving alongside 
de-industrialisation and retrenchments, illegal and unplanned settlement, so that, for example, 
half the urban population of Kenya and South Africa lives in slums (Moyo, The land question in 
Africa).  
Migration is not merely one-way. Workers retrenched from mines and farms are also known 
to seek peasantisation, as recorded in a case study of rural ‘squatting’ in Zimbabwe (Yeros, 
2002a), or as urbanites enter the land reform process (Moyo, The new peasant question in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa). Also, as opposed to secular urbanization, which Kay (2000) terms 
the ‘ruralization of urban areas’ and ‘urbanization of rural areas’, whereby rural and urban 
workers compete for both jobs, including agricultural jobs, and residential plots in both urban 
and rural areas. It has also been observed that retrenched workers from mines and industry 
have joined this struggle and sought to become peasants themselves (e.g. Bolivia where former 
miners have taken up coca production) (Petras, 1997). 
Thus urbanization and proletarianisation are not definitive, and agrarian reform cannot be 
seen as anachronistic (see also Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001), nor must one underestimate the 
political significance of the countryside, in which the ‘end of land reform’ thesis writes off an 
alternative pattern of accumulation. The semi-proletarianisation thesis, under current agrarian 
change within the contemporary centre-periphery structure, does not provide for massive 
population relocations to the north (Moyo and Yeros, 2004). 
The effect has been the rise of a richer class of peasants, compared to the rest, who became 
semi-proletarianised or landless. Full proletarianisation was generally forestalled, not least by 
state action, and rural households held onto a plot of land and maintained the dual income 
strategy of petty-commodity production and wage labour (Harriss, 1992; Breman, 2000). Rural 
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non-farm activities and markets proliferated, so that between 30 and 40% of household incomes 
are now derived from off-farm sources (Mooij, 2000). This dual trend suggests that ‘the informal 
sector [in the urban economy] is not a stepping stone towards a better and settled urban life, but 
a temporary abode for labour which can be pushed back to its place of origin when no longer 
needed’ (Breman, cited by Moyo and Yeros, 2004). 
The transition to capitalism in the periphery has taken place under disarticulated 
accumulation and subordinated to the accumulation needs of the centre. In consequence, it has 
not been characterised by an ‘American path’ (Moyo and Yeros, 2004), as identified by Lenin –
that is, a broad-based accumulation by petty-commodity producers ‘from below’– but by varied 
paths (Ibid and see inter alia de Janvry, 1981; Byres, 1991; and Moyo, The new peasant 
question in Zimbabwe and South Africa). These include a ‘junker path’ of landlords-turned-
capitalists in Latin America and Asia (outside East Asia), with its variant in the white-settler 
societies of Southern Africa, operating in tandem with transnational capital (whether landowning 
or not). Recently, with large agrarian capital it has also expanded and converted land away 
farming to wildlife management, or ‘eco-tourism’ ventures, a ‘merchant path’ comprising a 
variety of urban [petty] bourgeois elements with access to land, whether leasehold or freehold, 
via the state, the market or land reform, farming on a medium scale but integrated into export 
markets and global agro-industry (Moyo and Yeros, 2004). 
Measures of ‘poverty reduction’, including ‘integrated rural development programmes’, 
sought to bolster this functional dualism at its moment of crisis from the 1980s, leading to the 
abandonment of the poverty agenda, and the tendency for proletarianisation to accelerate, 
although direct and indirect political action, and a series of social catastrophes, have (World 
Bank, 1990) even brought back land reform in its market-based form (Moyo and Yeros, 2004). 
Where the neoliberal social agenda failed spectacularly in Zimbabwe, large-scale re-
peasantisation had taken place outside the control of the World Bank, and hence, because of 
penalties imposed from the north, a new pattern of ‘accumulation from below’ has not yet 
emerged (Yeros, 2002b; Moyo, The new peasant question in Zimbabwe and South Africa). 
Various social hierarchies derived from gender, generation, race, caste and ethnicity have 
intensified under capitalism and functional dualism (Yeros, 2002b; Moyo, The new peasant 
question in Zimbabwe and South Africa), since disarticulated accumulation and its corollary of 
semi-proletarianisation provide the structural economic basis for the flourishing of powerful 
social hierarchies that either fuse with class (e.g. race, caste) or cut across it (gender), and 
reproduce apparently ‘non-capitalist’ forms of ‘landlordism’, even despite the historical 
culmination of the ‘junker path’ (Yeros, 2002b; Moyo, The new peasant question in Zimbabwe 
and South Africa). The synergy between class and race is notable in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa, where both historical domination and the process of resistance have fused class and 
race discourses (Moyo and Yeros, 2004).  
Consequently, demands for agrarian reform have struck at the heart of the dominant 
national/cultural identities through which the conditions of super-exploitation are reproduced. In 
Africa, however, the issues of race and class have been strongly politicised for a longer period 
(Fanon, 2001; Cabral, 1979), and armed national liberation struggles against colonialism 
intensified them. The attainment of majority rule across the continent, within the neo-colonial 
framework, was characterised by the nurturing of small indigenous outward-looking 
bourgeoisies combined to defend nationally the disarticulated pattern of accumulation, while in 
Southern Africa neo-colonialism coincided with structural adjustment. National politics have 
been galvanised by rural and urban class struggles informed by growing class differentiation 
among blacks, and inter-capitalist conflict between emergent black bourgeoisies and 
established white capital, both outward looking, and both bidding over the land question. The 
result has been a stark bifurcation of the national question: on the one hand, black capital has 
confronted white capital, transforming the meaning of ‘national liberation’ in its own terms and 
hijacking land reform. On the other hand, the historical realities of class and race persist, 
characterised by functional dualism within a white supremacist framework, including the 
racialised landlordisms to which it gives rise (Moyo, 2001; Rutherford, 2001; Yeros, 2002b). 
Gender hierarchy has been as intrinsic to functional dualism as race, male labour for mines 
and farms resting on a policy of confining women to the communal area by institutionalised 
means, under despotic chieftaincies (Channok, 1985; Schmidt, 1990; Mamdani, 1996). While 
chieftaincy has been transformed in variable ways, and women have entered the labour market 
in large numbers, they have continued to be a rural pillar of functional dualism. Under structural 
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adjustment, gender hierarchy has been thoroughly instrumentalised, as structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) have curtailed social services and relied on female reproductive labour, 
which in turn has intensified, as well as on child labour. At the same time, women have also 
been compelled to diversify the sources of household income. However, the traditional 
obstacles to access to land have persisted and remained subject to patriarchal kinship relations, 
while the illegal use of land has in many cases proliferated (Moyo, 1995; Agarwal, 1994; Deere 
and León, 2001).  
The above trends underlie the emergence of scattered but significant land conflicts in the 
region, a direct negative outcome of neo-liberal land reforms, which tends to fuel renewed 
struggles over national and democracy questions. The rest of this paper examines these land 
questions and land reform experiences in Southern Africa, including the nature of the neo-
radical fast-track land reforms of Zimbabwe, and the regional implications of these for the future 
land questions in the SADC region. 
 
Land concentration, privatisation and external control in Southern Africa 
Historical context of the land question in Southern Africa 
The overriding land question facing Southern Africa is that little progress has been achieved 
in the implementation of land reform, especially with regard to redressing colonially derived and 
post-independence unequal land ownership, discriminatory land use regulations, and insecure 
land tenure systems, which marginalize the majority of rural and urban poor populations. The 
legacy of racially unequal land control, which confronted mainly the former settler colonies, was 
at independence maintained through constitutions that guaranteed the protection of private 
property by sanctifying willing-seller-willing-buyer approaches to the redistribution of freehold 
land. Those SADC states, with legacies of limited settler colonialism, have tended to face the 
challenges of promoting equitable legal and administrative systems of land tenure security and 
effective land management within a context of growing land concentration and agrarian class 
differentiation. 
A major underlying problem which confronts these land questions in Southern Africa is the 
continued increase in population among the peasantries in marginal and congested lands, 
without a net increase in the access to the maldistributed and underutilized arable lands, and a 
slow rate of growth in land productivity and agricultural intensification. Discriminatory land use 
policies and practices, and land tenure laws, have tended to encourage underutilization of land 
or inefficient land use among large-scale farmers, who nonetheless have high levels of 
productivity on limited parts of the land they control. Yet, expanding the number of landholders 
through land redistribution could redress the land shortages and the patterns of insecurity of 
tenure that arise from maldistribution of land. Instead, Southern African land reform policies 
have focused on reforming the regulation of land use and environmental management practices 
among smallholders, as well as customary tenures towards market-based land tenure systems, 
in the belief that these can lead to increased agricultural investment and intensification. 
A persistent feature of the land reform question in the sub-region is therefore that racial 
imbalance and historic grievances over land expropriation provide a binding force for the 
political mobilization of social grievance and growing poverty for land reform. Independence, 
political settlement and reconciliation policies in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa have thus 
failed to curb racial conflict in a context where the peace dividend of the mid-1990s has not led 
to economic growth throughout the sub-region, nor delivered structural changes that include the 
majority into the formal economy. Not surprisingly, even in the non-settler territories, the land 
problem and its racial foundations resonate. Thus, conflict over land tends to be fueled by 
ideological and land policy discourses which, in Southern Africa, have not resolved the question 
of whether and to what degree the rights held by whites over land that had been expropriated 
historically are valid and socially and politically legitimate (Moyo, 2003). 
Land reform discourses are further fueled by the myth that the freehold landholding system 
and private land markets are more efficient and superior to customary (so-called “communal”) 
land tenure systems. This myth tends to justify the preservation of unequally held land in the 
dual tenure systems, while incorrectly arguing that land reform per se undermines food security 
and exports, as well as the confidence of the investors in the economy. While this may be 
correct where conflictive land transfers obtain, as in Zimbabwe since 2000, this could be a short 
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to medium-term transitional problem, depending on the support given to new settlers. In this 
context, where smallholder farmers are regarded as being less efficient in land use, productivity 
and ecological practices, intrinsically, than large-scale white farmers, who hold large chunks of 
the prime lands and other resources, this prophecy can be sustained by the withholding of 
agricultural resources from so-called subsistence farmers. That is, land reform can only succeed 
to the degree that attendant resources are reallocated by the state and through appropriate 
market interventions. 
Land conflicts today result from grievances over and struggles for access to land and natural 
resources by both the poor and emerging black capitalist classes. Such grievances reflect the 
deep roots of social polarisation along racial and nationality lines. These arise historically from 
the discriminatory treatment of blacks on farms, mines and towns through a proletarianisation 
process based on land alienation and cheap labour mobilisation, and the persistence of racially 
inequitable development. The increasing radicalization of land acquisition approaches in 
Namibia and South Africa, and the growth of the tactic of land occupations in the SADC region 
since the 1990s, are manifestations of this deeply rooted phenomenon of common grievances 
over the unresolved land questions, and the failure of markets or landowners to reallocate land 
to a broader constituency. 
 
Racial and foreign land distribution patterns 
The existing structure and patterns of land inequalities in Southern Africa are based upon a 
relatively unique racial distribution of socio-economic features including population, wealth, 
income and employment patterns (Moyo, 2003). Land expropriation was rampant in most 
Southern African countries, and only Botswana had no white settlers by 1958. On the other 
hand, Angola, Lesotho and Zambia had lower percentages of alienated land. In terms of settler 
population, Namibia seems to have had a significant white settler population, mainly composed 
of the Afrikaners and Germans, in 1960, with 19%. The greatest white settler land alienation 
occurred in South Africa, where 87% of the land was alienated in the 18th century.  
Although at independence the white settler populations have tended to decrease, the 
proportion of land possessed by white minorities has tended not to decrease proportionately in 
former settler lands, while there has been a gradual increase in foreign landholdings in 
countries such as Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi, in the context of renewed interest by 
private international capital in tourism based on the control of natural resources (Moyo, 2003).  
Countries such as South Africa and Namibia are confronted with unequal land holdings with 
titled land in the hands of a few white commercial farmers. This pattern is excessive in South 
Africa, where 60,000 white farmers, who make up only 5% of the white population, own almost 
87% (85.5 million) of the land. Only 20,000 white commercial farmers produce 80% of the gross 
agricultural product. A further 40,000, including some 2,000 black farmers, produce 15%, while 
500,000 families living in the former homelands produce an estimated 5%. At least 12 million 
blacks inhabit 17.1 million hectares of land, and no more than 15% (or 2.6 million hectares) of 
this land is potentially arable (Wildschut and Hulbert, 1998). Thus, whites own 6 times more 
land in terms of the quantity of land available and its quality (Wildschut and Hulbert, 1998).  
However, Namibia has the highest number of white settlers, with about 8% of the total 
population. Commercial land under freehold title comprises approximately 6,300 farms, 
belonging to 4,128 mostly white farmers, and measuring about 36.2 million hectares. The 
freehold land covers 44% of available land and 70% of the most productive agricultural land, 
covering 36 million hectares. Only 2.2 million hectares of the commercial farmland belong to 
black farmers. By contrast, communal lands comprise 138,000 households with an area of 33.5 
million hectares, which is only 41% of the land available.  
In countries with predominant customary land tenure systems, there is a tendency to high 
population densities on land regarded as poor around largely mountainous areas and scarce 
arable land. In fact, in Swaziland and Malawi, the struggle for equitable land ownership invokes 
the control by traditional leaders over land allocation (Mashinini, 2000). Increased privatisation 
of state lands as part of the foreign investment drive has crowded out the poor onto the worst 
lands. In Mozambique, although all land is constitutionally state land, “privatisation” started in 
1984 as part of the implementation of the structural adjustment programmes. This has created 
grounds for racial animosity, as foreigners and white South Africans tend to dominate this 
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investment. Confrontation over land in Zimbabwe has seen the emigration of white 
Zimbabweans to Mozambique
3
. Mozambican officials have called for greater social integration 
of incoming white farmers to avoid creation of “white islands” where commercial development 
outpaces that of the indigenous populations who surround these new settlers. 
In Zimbabwe, before the fast-track land reform programme, most of the freehold lands were 
in the hands of 4,500 whites (comprising 0.03% of the population) and located in the most fertile 
parts of the country, with the most favorable climatic conditions and water resources. White 
farmers controlled 31% of the country’s freehold land, or about 42% of the agricultural land, 
while 1.2 million black families subsisted on 41% of the country’s area of 39 million hectares.  
A diverse and differentiated structure of land tenure and land use also exists among the 
regions with white population. Racial ownership of land ranges from family landowners to a few 
white-dominated large companies –most of which are multinational companies with strong 
international linkages. Whilst these companies tend to under-utilize most of their land, it is 
however the nationality and citizenship of large landowners that is mostly contested. In 
Zimbabwe, it is estimated that between 20,000 to 30,000 white Zimbabweans are British and 
South Africans with dual citizenship
4
. While the definition of who is indigenous remains 
contested, even for non-white members of minority groups who are citizens by birth or through 
naturalization, absentee land ownership exacerbates feelings against foreign land ownership. In 
Namibia, corporate ownership of land hides the influx of foreign landowners, particularly those 
who are shifting land use from agricultural use to tourism. 
Foreign land ownership has a historical and contemporary dimension to it. Past colonial land 
expropriation tends now to be reinforced by new land concessions to foreign investors. This 
tends to be complicated socially and politically by the physical absence of many foreign large-
scale landowners. Foreign landowners increasingly use stock holding land tenure arrangements 
for the control of land, especially in the growing eco-tourist industry, thus increasing the 
globalization of the region’s land question (Moyo, 2000). The rural poor are thus marginalized 
from their own landscape, and livelihood systems are undermined. 
The market paradigm shift of the 1980s saw new waves of migration by white large farmers 
into Zambia, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
 
This migration, encouraged 
by neo-liberal investment policies, has led to increased foreign land ownership in many 
countries and pressures for increased private land tenure property regimes in order to protect 
investments. 
The agricultural sector has been the prime target of such investment through lucrative 
incentives provided for foreign investment, especially in export processing zones.  
 
Contested settler notions of land size and peasant marginalisation 
Per capita arable land ownership per household has been declining due to the increase in 
population in the regions’ customary tenure areas, while the few white and some black large-
scale farmers own most of the best arable land in farms that are oversized. Thus, according to 
IFAD (2001), poverty tends to be concentrated in households with farm sizes under 1ha, and 
especially under 0.5ha. While poor black smallholders and the landless call for increased land 
redistribution, rural and urban black elites also call for access to large over-sized commercial 
farms, as it happened recently in Zimbabwe, where the prescribed land size ceilings are based 
upon outdated notions of the land sizes required for “viable” commercial farming
5
. 
Farm sizes in the region reflect the trends in land ownership. In Namibia, the average white 
LSCF farm size is 5,700 hectares. In Zimbabwe, the average was 2,500, with variation between 
NR II to V
6
. In the communal areas, the average farm size is around 2 hectares, and in 
resettlement, it is 5 hectares. In South Africa 28.5% of the farms were larger than 1,000 
hectares (Wildschut and Hulbert, 1998). In Malawi 40% of the smallholders cultivate less than 
0.5ha, with an average farm size of 0.28ha (IFAD, 2001). The areas inhabited by smallholders 
have the highest poverty.  
The resettlement programmes in the region are proceeding on the basis of small-sized farms 
for blacks averaging less than 10 hectares of arable land in areas such as NR II in Zimbabwe. 
Land reform based on controlling farm sizes through ceilings has not been pursued in most of 
the countries.  
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This leaves a few landowners holding excessively large tracts of land. Using the cut-off point 
of over 10,000 hectares owned either through company or individual title, or as single or 
multiple farms, about 66 landowners (with 158 farms) occupied over two million hectares of 
Zimbabwe’s land by 1998 (Moyo, 2003). Most of these farms are multiple owned company 
farms. Multiple farm ownership is thus a decided feature of Zimbabwe’s landed gentry, whether 
company or individually owned. 
The criterion used to determine viable farm sizes is based on a legacy of white settler 
notions of the ‘small scale’ being subsistence oriented, and the ‘commercial’ being large-scale 
white farms. 
Although the categorisation is posited as a function of different resource levels, there is a 
fundamental class and racial basis for its definition. Historically, large farms have prescribed 
higher levels of income targets for whites, against lower ‘subsistence’ incomes for blacks. The 
latter were required to provide cheap labour to supplement incomes. Large-sized plots are also 
said to allow for multiple land uses at a ‘commercial’ scale, and to allow some of the land to 
remain fallow for some time. They are also considered necessary for mechanised agriculture, 
on the false grounds that economies of scale obtain in farming. Yet blacks have historically 
been unable to acquire large-scale machinery through institutionalised resource allocation 
biases and financial institution discrimination. However, whilst many of the large farms so 
supported are productive by the region’s standards, most of their lands are underutilized. 
In order to conceal land under-utilization and speculative uses of land, white commercial 
farmers and multinational companies have tended to put their land under wildlife ranching, even 
though the social and economic benefits of such uses remain contested (Moyo, 2000). 
Nonetheless investing in game ranching, tourism in the form of conservancy requires the 
continued exclusion from large areas of the poor, and in some countries the enclosure of newly 
consolidated lands to the same end. Various shareholding structures that remain in the clique of 
white farmers exclude both elite and poor blacks, who contest such arrangements through 
various strategies, including land occupations. The tourism sector has justified the exclusion of 
blacks by arguing that it is too technical for black smallholders’ land management, and that its 
marketing requirements are too sophisticated for them. It is argued that the latter should instead 
concentrate on less technical crops such as food grains rather than horticulture export crops 
(World Bank, 1991; 1995). 
This racist notion is buttressed by the belief that blacks only aim to secure home 
consumption and residence, and that they do not require land for commercial uses. However, 
the output performance of smallholders, including resettled black farmers and those who have 
invested in peri-urban areas, demonstrates that with adequate access to land blacks contribute 
substantially to domestic and export markets. Unfortunately, racism, in some donor circles as 
well, continues to pursue the misplaced notion that when blacks obtain large-sized land through 
state support, it is only a reflection of unproductive cronyism rather than a de-racialisation 
process. However, since historically whites obtained large-sized land aimed at commercialising 
farming through the same procedures, such notions are unfounded.  
These contradictions of access to land based on race, class and nationality cleavages are 
thus a fundamental source of conflict over demands for land in a region where the hegemonic 
neoliberal ideology in fact promotes agrarian capitalism, with lip service paid to poverty 
reduction-focused land reform. 
 
Land reform experiences in the SADC states 
The demand for land reform 
The demand for land redistribution, in terms both of redressing historical and racially 
grounded inequities and of growing needs by both the black poor (rural and urban) and black 
elites, has been a consistent feature of Southern African politics and policymaking. Recently, 
most of these countries have been formulating land policies in response to both pressures for 
redistribution.  
These efforts are dominated by official perspectives that tend to emphasize the conversion 
of customary tenure systems to private freehold land tenure systems. Most official analyses of 
the land question have, however, tended to underestimate the nature and scale of demand for 
155 
 
land redistribution, and to ignore the racial tensions that have persisted as a result of the 
unfinished land reform agenda.  
The demand for land reform takes various forms and arises from various sources. These 
include formal and informal demands, legal and underground, or illegal, forms of demand for 
land redistribution, and demands that may be based upon the restitution of historic rights, or 
contemporary demands based upon different needs. The different socio-political organizations 
that mediate such demands include civil society organizations, farmers’ unions, political parties, 
War Veterans Associations, business representatives’ associations, community-based 
organizations and traditional structures. Such structures are central to the evolution of the 
demand for land redistribution. The social content of these structures, however, is decidedly 
racially polarized in Southern Africa, while the class composition of the “visible” policy actors 
has been elitist. 
Since the decolonization of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia, the debate on land reform 
has mainly been focused on market instruments of land transfer. Despite broad consensus 
among governments, the landless, landowners and the international community on the need for 
land reform in the sub-region, land reform remains limited. The onset of structural adjustment 
programmes, as well as multiparty “democratization” in Southern Africa since the 1980s, have 
tended to reinforce the liberal political and market dimensions of debate on the land questions. 
In the process of economic liberalisation, however, informal rural political demands for land, 
including land occupations and natural resource poaching, have remained a critical source of 
advocacy for radical land reform, and, indeed, have succeeded in keeping land reform on the 
agenda (Moyo, 2001). Over time, the salient land demands of the black middle classes and 
elites have tended to be advanced within civil society organizations and both the ruling and 
opposition parties, within a liberal political and human rights framework, which leaves the 
fundamental issues of economic restructuring and redistribution of resources to the market 
(Moyo, 2001). 
Thus, the predominantly urban-led civil society has not formally embraced the land reform 
agenda, perhaps due to the enduring middle-class basis of its leadership, especially in the NGO 
movement.  
 
Limited civil society advocacy for land reform 
This has relegated rural social movements on land reform to informal politics, while giving 
prominence to more organized, middle-class civic groups and policy organizations that typically 
advocate market-based methods of land reform and liberal civic and political rights issues. Yet, 
the race question of land reform persistently dominates land reform struggles and debate, 
because the land to be redistributed is mainly expected to come from land largely owned by 
whites, while the black potential beneficiaries compete for redistribution and affirmative action 
along class lines, but in the common name of healing the wounds of past grievances.  
This raises contradictory tendencies in the ideologies and foci of social movements between 
those who struggle for access to social (land and broader resource redistribution) rights and 
those focused on political (civic and human) rights. Thus, most civil society organisations, which 
are generally one-issue oriented in their advocacy, have tended to divide between those with 
structuralist (redistributionist) and proceduralist (governance) perspectives of social and 
economic change, even though in reality both issues need to be addressed in calibrated 
combination. Over the years, however, the formal demand for radical or merely extensive land 
reform has tended to be submerged, especially in recent struggles for democratization, by the 
proceduralist thrust of civil society activism, much of which is ensconced within a neoliberal 
framework. This is reinforced by the fact that the balance of external aid, in Zimbabwe, for 
example, has tilted in the last five years towards the support of governance activism.  
While such support is necessary, this trend has served to highlight mainly the issues of 
human rights and electoral transgressions by the state, to the detriment of the redress of 
structural and social rights issues. The exceptions here are food aid and HIV/AIDS and health, 
which defy the dichotomy and tend to be considered as basic humanitarian support.  
Civil society discourses on land reform, therefore, to the extent that they go beyond rule of 
law issues, have been focused on a critique of methods of land acquisition and allocation, 
without offering alternatives to land market acquisition and expropriation instruments or 
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mobilizing the more deserving beneficiaries of land reform in support of extensive land reform in 
the face of resistance by landlords and other stakeholders. Because of the polarization of 
society on political party and ideological grounds, in Zimbabwe, for example, engaging the state 
in furtherance of land reform has been sacrificed for rejecting the administrative processes and 
legal rules applied in land reform, despite legal challenges and resistance. Yet, there is a fait 
acompli redistribution on the grounds (see also Nyoni, 2004) that this trend of civil society land 
advocacy is not conjunctural or limited to the Zimbabwe experience. 
Historically, Southern Africa in general has not had an organized civil society that has made 
radical demands for land reform or land redistribution. Under colonial rule the land cause was 
led by the liberation movements, and in the 1970s it was pursued by means of armed struggle 
(Chitiyo, 2000). In the independence period, civil society land advocacy has been constrained 
by their predominantly middle-class, social welfarist and neoliberal developmentalist values, 
which are in turn dependent on international aid. Meanwhile, formal rural and urban community-
based organizations which seek land tend to be appendages of middle-class driven 
intermediary civil society organizations, while local land occupation movements have tended to 
be shunned by them (Moyo, 1998). The rural operations of NGOs within a neoliberal framework 
have thus been characterized by demands for funds for small “development” projects aimed at a 
few selected beneficiaries (Moyo, Raftopolous and Makumbe, 2000), and have left a political 
and social vacuum in the leadership of the land reform agenda. 
Advocacy for land reform in the region has increasingly been dominated by former liberation 
movements’ associations, scattered traditional leaders and spiritual mediums, special-interest 
groups and other narrowly based structures rather than by broadly-based civil society 
organisations, as we have seen in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. In the latter, a few left-
leaning NGO groups have supported the formation of the Landless People’s Movement (LPM), 
although the contradictions of white middle-class intellectual leadership of black people’s 
landless structures, and the transclass and nationalist nature of the interests in land, have 
become evident in the slow maturation of a nation-wide radical land reform agenda. 
Black indigenization or affirmative action lobbies, some with ethno-regional and gender foci, 
have on the other hand re-focused the land reform agenda, including the demand for the “return 
of lost lands” more towards the de-racialization of the ownership base of commercial farmland, 
at times as a racial substitution formula for capitalist farming (Moyo, 2001). So far, however, a 
dual approach of land redistribution to large black and poor peasants remains on the formal or 
official land reform agenda, even if resource allocations have tended to favour elites. However, 
large white farmer organizations, black technocrats, and many NGOs, have tended to support 
the commercial-farmer orientation of land redistribution in general, given their general tendency 
to believe in the inefficiency of small farmers. This has shifted policy discourses on the criteria 
for access to land, refocusing the redistribution vision from the “landless” and “insecure” 
towards the “capable”, and presumed “efficient”, indigenous agrarian capitalists, within the 
terms of the neoliberal global development paradigm.  
This is exemplified, for instance, even in the similarity between the bi-focal land allocation 
policies of the opposed political parties, in the case of the Zanu-PF-led government of 
Zimbabwe and the MDC (MDC, 2004). The former talks about providing the needy (the landless 
and ‘congested’) and the ‘capable’ with land as defined by the A1 and A2 allocation schemes 
respectively, while the latter promises to give according to need and ability. Neither defines 
formally the proportionate class-based tilt intended in the land allocations, although in 
Zimbabwe 35% of the land has so far been given to the capable elites, which number less than 
20,000, compared to 130,000 ‘needy’ beneficiaries. This however suggests also that there is a 
common intra-elite bipartisan interest in a capitalist agrarian class project. These terms of the 
land reform agenda tend also to be dictated by the favourable disposition of the middle-class 
and elite dominated political party and civil society to external (global) markets, buttressed by 
optimistic expectations of the promise of foreign investment. The latter, it seems, tends to be 
expected to obviate the need for extensive redistributive land reform, and the belief exists that 
the latter could be substituted by other economic development benefits, including employment 
creation. But employment growth remains appallingly low and informalised and well below 
survival wages among the majority, while the rural remain marginalised.  
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Neoliberal land reform programme design 
In this context, the objectives and strategies for land redistribution adopted in the region 
vary. Land redistribution programmes have tended to emphasize rehabilitating and politically 
stabilizing countries torn by armed struggles. The generic objectives of land reform in most 
Southern African countries tend to include: to decongest overpopulated areas; to increase the 
base of productive agriculture; to rehabilitate people displaced by war; to resettle squatters, the 
destitute, the landless; to promote equitable distribution of agricultural land; to de-racialise 
commercial agriculture. These are mostly underpinned by the aim of addressing historical 
injustices of colonial land expropriation and to assert the right of access of ‘indigenes’. Land 
redistribution initiatives in the region have tended to be constrained by existing legal, 
institutional and constitutional frameworks, which have led to costly and slow processes of land 
acquisition and transfer of land rights to various beneficiaries. Land redistribution policies have 
tended to be influenced by market-oriented approaches to land acquisition and proscribed by 
the legal challenge, by large landowners, of the land expropriation mechanism, while the 
negotiated voluntary transfers of large amounts of land on a significant scale has not occurred. 
The experience with land redistribution in the SADC region has been in general based upon 
four inter-related tactical approaches. 
The dominant approach, used mainly in Zimbabwe and Namibia before the implementation 
of compulsory land acquisition, is the state-centred but market-based approach to land 
transfers. Land was purchased by the state for redistribution following willing-seller-willing-buyer 
procedures. The private sector led land identification and supply through the market, and the 
central government was a reactive buyer choosing land on offer. Governments identify the 
demand and match the private supply with beneficiaries selected by its officials. The land 
restitution approach followed in South Africa is essentially a state initiative in which government 
pays mostly market prices for land claims of individuals and communities in a limited land rights 
and time-bound framework. These programmes were slow in redistributing land, except during 
the early years in Zimbabwe, when this was accompanied by extensive land occupations of 
abandoned white lands.  
The use of compulsory land acquisition by the state with compensation for land and 
improvements has been pursued in the region since the 1990s, mainly in Zimbabwe. This 
approach involves direct intervention by the government in the identification and acquisition of 
land at market prices, and governments tend to manage the resettlement process, although 
settler selection is generally more locally controlled. Zimbabwe has used a mass compulsory 
acquisition strategy, and up to 7,000 farm properties have been gazetted for acquisition 
between 1992 and 2001. Litigation by landowners against compulsory acquisition has been a 
key constraint. In South Africa, a few cases of compulsory acquisition have recently evolved out 
of its land restitution programme, given the resistance of landowners to part with their land, 
while legislation was amended in 2003 to enable smoother land expropriation. The South 
African government argues that this approach will be used sparingly. In early 2004, the 
Namibian government initiated legal measures to expropriate eight farms, three of which are 
intended to assuage urban landlessness, while some of the others are being expropriated in 
response to the eviction of farm workers from their farms by their landlords. 
A third approach to land redistribution that has been tried to a limited degree in both South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, in the context of testing “alternative” approaches, is the market-assisted 
land reform approach, espoused mainly by the World Bank. This land reform approach is meant 
to be led by the private sector, communities and NGOs, which identity land for transfer or 
beneficiaries to purchase land within a market framework. This framework of land acquisition 
seems to favour the large landowners’ compensation requirements given the land price 
response to demand. However, black communities in the sub-region resist paying for land, 
which they feel was expropriated through conquest. Very little land has been redistributed 
through this approach so far, mainly in South Africa. Efforts to follow this approach in Zimbabwe 
during 1998 and 1999 were aborted before they took off as the actors tended to fail to agree on 
financing the process, on the combined use of market and compulsory acquisition, and on 
approaches to the identification of agreed amounts of land and beneficiaries for redistribution. 
Finally there is the community-led land self-provisioning (Moyo, 2000) strategy, mainly in the 
form of land occupations or invasions by potential beneficiaries. This approach has tended to be 
either state facilitated and formalized, or repressed by the state at various points in time (Moyo, 
2000; Raftopoulos, 2003; Alexander, 2003 and Marongwe, 2003). As a formal strategy to land 
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redistribution, it has not been implemented on a large scale in most of the countries, except in 
Zimbabwe during the first four years after independence, and in 2000 under different political 
and economic conditions, with different formal responses by the state in the two periods, and its 
repression during the mid-1980s to mid-1990s. Occasional isolated land occupations have been 
reported in Malawi, Botswana and South Africa. The latter however experienced large urban 
land occupations between the 1980s and early 1990s, which are being formalized in home 
ownership schemes. This however is not a formal government policy in the SADC region, and 
tends in fact to be officially discouraged in general. 
These various approaches to land redistribution increasingly tend to be used in combination, 
although the market-based approach has remained dominant. Recent donor support for land 
reform tends to favour the as yet untested market-assisted approach to land reform, and is 
intended to provide an alternative to the pursuit of compulsory acquisition on a large scale or to 
pure willing-seller-willing-buyer approaches. However, most of the Southern African countries 
facing demands for land reform may require strong state intervention in land markets given the 
legacy of inequitable social capital and the control of financial markets. 
Given the general slow pace of land reform in the region, persistent popular demands for 
land redistribution in terms of both redressing historical and racially-grounded inequities and in 
terms of the growing demands by both the black poor (rural and urban) and black elites for land 
to enhance their livelihoods and accumulation strategies respectively, have consistently 
resurfaced on the Southern Africa political and land policy agendas. These structures have 
tended to be central to influencing the evolution of the demand for land redistribution both in 
collaboration and in confrontation with the state.  
The social and political mobilisation for land reform in Southern Africa has heightened racial 
and class polarisation and contradictions around approaches to implementing land reform within 
a context of democratisation. For example, in Zimbabwe, war veterans, landless peasants, and 
the urban poor, utilised land occupations, in collaboration with dominant elements in the state 
and ruling party, to force the government to pursue official compulsory land acquisition in a fast-
track programme. In South Africa, the demand for land has mainly been in the urban and peri-
urban areas, given that 70% of the population is urbanised. However, the demand for land in 
the rural areas is also growing and leading to polarisation at the political party level and 
between white farmers and blacks demanding access to the land of their ancestors, backed by 
significant violence against landowners. The emergence in South Africa of a landless people’s 
movement demanding land redistribution for workers and peasants, with an explicit threat to 
boycott the ANC in elections, has had the effect (alongside the pressures from Zimbabwe’s 
experiences) of bringing greater urgency to that government’s land reform initiatives. 
Official and formal studies tend to underestimate the demand for land, especially in 
Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. Recent experiences of rural land occupations in 
Zimbabwe and in peri-urban South Africa and Namibia show the intensity of popular demand for 
land redistribution among a diverse range of beneficiaries such as the rural landless, former 
refugees, war veterans, the poor and former commercial farm workers, the urban poor and 
black elite (Moyo, 2001; Kinsey, 1999). Thus, while land reform has been rural-oriented and 
focused on promoting national food security and agricultural development, urban demand has 
also come to the fore. The cutting edge of demands for land reform at this stage thus rests on 
expanding the access and rights to land by the poor, the landless and disadvantaged sections 
of society such as women and farm workers, and a nascent black agrarian capitalist class.  
 
The scale and nature of land redistribution 
The scale and social composition of those benefiting from land redistribution thus far has 
been narrow. Since independence in 1990, only about 30,000 black Namibians have been 
resettled. Of these, 6,515 only have been resettled on commercial farms. The rest have been 
resettled in communal areas. Land reform in South Africa has gradually picked up pace, 
although less than 3% of the white-held lands have been redistributed. By 1998, Zimbabwe had 
redistributed 3.6 million hectares to 70.000 families, during the first five years of independence. 
Between 2000 and 2004, about 130,000 families have been resettled on about 10 million 
hectares of land expropriated under the fast-track programme. However, much of the acquired 
land is still being contested by landowners, and the provision of infrastructure and services to 
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the resettled families has been minimal, given the lack of state resources during the attendant 
economic downturn.  
The demand for land redistribution increasingly includes the emerging black middle classes, 
such as business executives, agricultural graduates, academics, including civil servants. The 
key issue now facing the region’s land reform policies is how to balance the control and access 
to land by existing large-scale landholders who underutilize their land, the demands of new 
small and medium-scale aspiring farmers. De-racialising commercial farming is a policy 
perspective that has been gaining importance in this context, and to a critical extent at the 
expense of the landless.  
In Zimbabwe, land reform in the 1990s promoted emergent black large-scale farmers in what 
appeared less as a resettlement than a land reallocation programme intending to redress racial 
imbalances. Thus, state land had been used to facilitate access to land by about 400 middle-
class blacks, while another 1,000 blacks used their own resources to purchase about 760,000 
hectares.  
By 1999, black elites held about 11% of Zimbabwe’s commercial farmlands. The fast-track 
process then added 19,000 more new small to medium commercial-scale farmers, as discussed 
below. In South Africa and Namibia, policies have also sought to create and empower black 
commercial farmers as an integral aspect of land reform.  
In this context, land reform has tended to marginalize critical vulnerable and organized 
groups. For example, special groups such as war veterans in Zimbabwe and elsewhere have 
received particular attention in policy, but their prescribed quota of resettlement land has 
generally not been met. Whereas significant progress has begun to be seen in recognizing 
women’s land rights in policy, in practice women’s land rights have remained marginalized at 
law in most of the countries. Farm workers’ land rights, especially to residential and farming 
land, have tended to be marginalized in all the former settler territories. In Zimbabwe, the fast-
track land reform programme has accommodated less than 3% of the farm workers, while in 
Namibia and South Africa landlords continue to evict them at will. 
 
Conclusions: regional dimensions of radical land reform 
The effects of the Zimbabwean land reforms since 2000, as a dissident model of radical land 
reform on the Southern Africa region, need to be recognised at various levels, although there is 
a tendency by some to dwell only on some of the impacts leading to a narrow discourse on this 
matter (Moyo, Fast track land and agrarian reform). By far the most commonly considered 
impact has been the expectation that the process of land occupations as a popular strategy for 
redressing land grievances and hunger might replicate itself widely, especially in former settler 
states such as South Africa (Cousins, 2000; Rutherford, 2001; Lahiff, 2002), in Namibia and 
even Kenya. The formation of the Landless Peoples Movement of South Africa in 2001 was a 
significant sign of the prospect for the diffusion of land occupations
7
, since the urban land 
occupations in Johannesburg took place during 2001. These judgments all seem premature, 
given that the political coalition for majority rule appears to be relatively intact, and that the 
economic growth prospects of South Africa still look promising, despite the quite high levels of 
unemployment, poverty and wealth inequalities facing that country.  
The greatest incidence of land occupations in South Africa had already shown itself in the 
late 1980s during the political struggle and turmoil at that time, while sporadic land occupations 
had been observed in the late 1990s in Botswana (Molomo, 2002), in Namibia and in Malawi 
(Kanyongolo, 2004). These incidents had coincided with the low profile and sporadic land 
occupations that Zimbabwe had experienced at that time. Given the strict evictions of land 
occupiers that the South African government had begun to pursue since majority rule, it could 
be confidently claimed that these would not spread widely there or elsewhere in the region, and 
that instead the SADC governments were now more intent on pursuing orderly land reform 
(Lahiff, 2002). 
There has been a growing tendency among Southern African governments to rapidly 
develop comprehensive National Land Policies to pre-empt the Zimbabwe scenario, as we have 
seen in Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho in 2001, and in Botswana, Zambia and Angola in 2003 
(Lahiff, 2002). These national policies are yet to be implemented. There have also been efforts 
to improve the land redistribution policy and strategy in South Africa and Namibia since 2001. In 
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both these countries, small-scale attempts to utilise land expropriation laws were undertaken 
without much success during that period. In South Africa, streamlining the bureaucratic 
procedures for land restitution has since increased the pace of land transfers. Namibia has 
moved quite swiftly between 2001 and 2003 to institute a land tax which, together with the 
threat of land expropriation, may be expected to release more land for redistribution. Both 
countries are introducing regulations which limit the purchase of land by foreigners, particularly 
absentee landlords in the Namibia case. It also appears that donors are increasing their funding 
of these two countries’ land reforms. 
In most of these countries, the most salient land policy change, however, and perhaps the 
one with the greatest potential to re-concentrate landholdings, has been the legal provisions 
introduced to enable customary land tenures, under which the majority of people live, to lease 
out land to developers through long-term leasehold and natural resources concession 
arrangements. These policy developments largely emulate the Mozambique and Botswana 
customary tenure arrangements and expand the land lease practices already found in state-
held land and public natural resources property regimes. These policy directions have received 
much international donor support, while the SADC is currently in the process of adopting a 
Regional Land Reform Technical Facility intended to mobilise aid and regional expertise to 
improve land policy formation processes (Lahiff, 2002).  
In conclusion, land reform policies in Southern Africa seem to be evolving through the 
interactive use of market and compulsory approaches to land acquisition for redistribution, 
restitution and tenure reform to both the landless and an emerging black agrarian bourgeoisie.  
Official land reform policies are increasingly being forced to respond to growing popular 
demand for land. An important lesson to be learnt from the political independence settlements in 
the settler territories of the sub-region is that, by not sufficiently addressing the problem of 
inequitable land and natural resource ownership, the down-stream entrenchment of unequal 
racial economic opportunities ensuing from such control, in economies facing slow employment 
growth, is likely to fuel agitation for radical land reform. Thus, land redistribution, restitution and 
tenure reform to redress historical grievances, social justice and poverty are crucial ingredients 
of reconciliation and development, and essential to the resolution of the national question and 
democratization processes. 
 
 
Bibliography 
Agarwal, B 1994 A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Alexander, J. 2003 “‘Squatters’, veterans and the state in Zimbabwe” in Hammar, Amanda; 
Raftopoulos, Brain and Jensen, Stig (eds.) Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: rethinking land, state and 
nation in the context of crisis (Harare: Weaver Press). 
Breman, J. 2000 “Labour and Landlessness in South and South-east Asia” in Bryceson, D. et al. (eds.) 
Disappearing Peasantries? (London: ITDG Publishing). 
Bryceson, D. 2000 “Peasant Theories and Small Holder Policies: Past and Present” in Bryceson, D. 
(ed.) Disappearing Peasantries? (London: ITDG Publishing).  
Bryceson, D.; Kay, C. and Mooij, J. (eds.) 2000 Disappearing Peasantries? Rural Labour in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America (London: ITDG Publishing). 
Byres, T. J. 1991 “The agrarian question and differing forms of capitalist transition: an essay with 
reference to Asia” in Breman, J. and Mundle, S. (eds.) Rural transformation in Asia (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press). 
Cohen, R. 1991 “Peasants to Workers and Peasant-Workers in Africa” in Contested Domains: Debates 
in International Labour Studies (London and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed Books). 
Cabral, A. 1979 “Unity and Struggle” in Monthly Review Press (New York). 
161 
 
Channock, M. 1985 Law, custom and social order: the colonial experience in Malawi and Zambia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Chitiyo, T. 2000 “Land violence and compensation: reconceptualising Zimbabwe’s land and war 
veterans debate” in Track Two (South Africa) Vol. 9, N° 1.  
Cousins, B. 2000 “The Zimbabwe crisis: lessons for the Region. Could Land Invasions happen here 
too?”. Seminar paper, PLAAS, School of Government, UWC, South Africa. 
De Janvry, A. 1981 The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press). 
Deere, Carmen D. and León, Magdalena 2001 “Who Owns the Land? Gender and Land Titling 
Programmes in Latin America” in Journal of Agrarian Change, 1: 3.  
Fanon, F. 2001 (1961) The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin Books).  
First, R. 1983 Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant (Brighton: Harvester). 
Gibbon, P. and Neocosmos, M. 1985 “Some problems in the political economy of ‘African Socialism’” in 
Bernstein, Henry and Campbell, Bonnie (eds.) Contradictions of accumulation in Africa (Beverly 
Hills/London/New Delhi: Sage). 
Harriss, J. 1992 “Does the ‘Depressor’ still work? Agrarian structure and development in India: a review 
of evidence and argument” in Journal of Peasant Studies (UK) Vol 19, N° 2. 
IFAD 2001 (1999) “Assessment of rural poverty in the eastern and Southern African region”. Document 
circulated at the Workshop on Rural Poverty (Rome) 24-25 January. 
Kanyongolo, F. E. 2004 “Land occupations in Malawi: challenging the neoliberal legal order” in Moyo, 
Sam and Yeros, Paris (eds.) Reclaiming the land: The resurgence of rural movements in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America (London: Zed Publishers) Forthcoming Book. 
Kay, C. 2000 “Latin America’s agrarian transformation: peasantization and proletarianization” in 
Bryceson, D. et al. (eds.) Disappearing Peasantries? (London: ITDG Publishing). 
Kinsey, B. H. 1999 Determinants of rural household incomes and their impact on poverty and food 
security in Zimbabwe (Rome: Food and Agricultural Organisation). 
Lahiff, E. 2002 The regional implications of the crisis in Zimbabwe. Rational and principles of regional 
support for land reform and economic spillover (Zimbabwe: Institute of Security Studies) 27th 
November. 
Mamdani, M. 1996 Citizens and subjects: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism (UK: 
Princetown University Press). 
Marongwe, N. 2003 “Farm occupations and occupiers in the new politics of land in Zimbabwe” in 
Hammar, Amanda; Raftopoulos, Brain and Jensen, Stig (eds.) Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: 
rethinking land, state and nation in the context of crisis (Harare: Weaver Press). 
Mashinini, V. 2000 “The land problem in Lesotho: focus on contestation and conflicts”. Paper presented 
at the SARIPS/Sapes Trust Annual Colloquium (Harare) September 24th-27th. 
MDC 2004 RESTART: Our path to social justice. The MDC’s economic programme for reconstruction, 
stabilisation, recovery and transformation (Harare).  
Molomo, M. G. 2002 Land and sustainable development in Botswana (Harare: African Institute for 
Agrarian Studies) mimeo. 
Mooij, J. 2000 “Changing peasantries in Asia” in Bryceson, D. et al. (eds.) Disappearing Peasantries? 
(London: ITDG Publishing). 
Moyo, S. 1995 The land question in Zimbabwe (Harare: Sapes Trust). 
Moyo, S. 1998 The land acquisition process in Zimbabwe (1997/8) (Harare: United Nations 
Development Programme, UNDP).  
162 
 
Moyo, S. 2000 Land reform under structural adjustment in Zimbabwe: land use change in the 
Mashonaland provinces (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrika Institutet). 
Moyo, S.; Raftopolous, B. and Makumbe, J. M. 2000 NGOs and development in Zimbabwe (Harare: 
SAPES Books). 
Moyo, S. 2001 “The land occupation movement and democratization in Zimbabwe: contradictions of 
neo-liberalism” in Millennium: Journal of International Studies (UK) Vol. 30, N° 2. 
Moyo, S. 2003 “The politics of land distribution and race relations in Southern Africa” in forthcoming 
book on Racism and Public Policy to be published by Pallgrave Press (UK).  
Moyo, S. and Sukume, C. 2004 Agricultural sector and agrarian development strategy. Paper prepared 
for World Bank (Zimbabwe), Forthcoming.  
Moyo, S. and Yeros, P. “Land Occupations and Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Towards the National 
Democratic Revolution” in Moyo, Sam and Yeros, Paris (eds.) Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence 
of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America (London: Zed Books) Forthcoming. 
Moyo, S. Fast track land and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe contradictions of neo-liberalism. 
Forthcoming book to be published by Ford Foundation, South Africa. 
Moyo, S. The new peasant question in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Paper presented for publication. 
Moyo, S. The land question in Africa: research perspectives and questions (Dakar: CODESRIA Green 
Book) Forthcoming. 
Nyoni, J. 2004 “Zimbabwe land policy”. Paper presented at the Economic Conference on Zimbabwe 
Restart (Johannesburg, South Africa) 27th-28th February. 
Nzimande, B. 2004 “Continental perspectives on Zimbabwe”. Paper presented at the Economic 
Conference on Zimbabwe Restart (Johannesburg, South Africa) 27th-28th February. 
Petras, J. 1997 “Latin America: The Resurgence of the Left” in New Left Review (UK) N° 223. 
Petras, J. and Veltmeyer, H. 2001 “Are Latin American peasant movements still a force for change? 
Some new paradigms revisited” in Journal of Peasant Studies (UK) Vol. 28, N° 2. 
Presidential Land Review Committee (PLRC) 2003 Report of the Presidential Land Review Committee 
(Zimbabwe) Vol. 1 and 2, main report to his Excellency The President of The Republic of Zimbabwe, 
August. 
Raftopoulos, B. 2003 “The state in crisis: authoritarian nationalism, selective citizenship and distortions 
of democracy in Zimbabwe” in Hammar, Amanda; Raftopoulos, Brain and Jensen, Stig (eds.) 
Zimbabwe’s unfinished business: rethinking land, state and nation in the context of crisis (Harare: 
Weaver Press). 
Rutherford, B. 2001 “Commercial farm workers and the politics of displacement in Zimbabwe: 
colonialism, liberation and democracy” in Journal of Agrarian Change (UK) Vol. 1, N° 4. 
Rutherford, B. 2002 Labour, land and civil society: the case of farm workers (UK: Institute of 
Development Studies, Department of Agrarian and Labour Studies) First Annual. 
Schmidt, E. 1990 “Negotiated spaces and contested terrain: men, women and the law in colonial 
Zimbabwe, 1890–1939” in Journal of Southern African Studies (UK) Vol. 16, N° 4. 
Wildschut, A. and Hulbert, S. 1998 A seed not sown: prospects for agrarian reform in South Africa 
(South Africa: German Agro Action, Interfund and the National Land Committee) mimeo. 
World Bank 1990 World development report (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank). 
World Bank 1991 Zimbabwe: agriculture sector memorandum (Washington: World Bank) Vol I and II, 
N° 9429.  
World Bank 1995 Zimbabwe achieving shared growth: country economic memorandum (Washington: 
World Bank) Vol. 2.  
163 
 
Yeros, P. 2002a The political economy of civilisation: peasant-workers in Zimbabwe and the neo-
colonial world (University of London) PhD Thesis. 
Yeros, P. 2002b “Zimbabwe and the dilemmas of the left” in Historical Materialism (UK) Vol. 10, N° 2. 
 
Notes 
 
* Executive Director of the African Institute of Agrarian Studies, Harare, Zimbabwe. He has published several works 
related to the land question. 
** Revised paper presented at the CLASCO Conference on New Worldwide Hegemony. Alternatives for change and 
social movements, Havana, Cuba. 
 
1 A recent collection of essays entitled Disappearing Peasantries? (Bryceson, Kay and Mooij, 2000).  
2 Semi-proletarianisation has a longer pre-SAP history that is not well acknowledged, and is indeed generalisable to 
Africa (First, 1983; Cohen, 1991; Mamdani, 1996) and the rest of the periphery. 
3 Mozambique expects 100 white Zimbabweans commercial farmers, while 10 have been allocated 4,000 hectares 
in the Manica province. A group of 63 white Zimbabweans had requested 400,000 hectares, but the government of 
Mozambique has put a ceiling of 1,000 hectares per individual application (Daily News, 20/07/2001).  
4 Dual citizenship is not legal in Zimbabwe, and new amendments to tighten the law have recently been introduced, 
also generating problems around the citizenship of long standing Mozambicans and Malawian farm worker migrants 
who have not yet denounced their original citizenship. 
5 These land sizes have since undergone further reduction, even though they still remain on the high scale for 
viable commercial farming. 
6 That was until the government of Zimbabwe acquired and redistributed around 10 million hectares of land to an 
estimated 250,000 households (Moyo and Sukume, 2004). In addition, it gazetted maximum farm sizes per agro-
ecological natural region that obliterated the large farm sizes. 
7 Interview with Andile Mngxitama. 
